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To Clear or To Convict? The Role of Genomics in Criminal Justice1 
 
ANTHONY MARK CUTTER 
 
 
JUDGE SLATER: Look, I have signed hundreds of search warrants 
for Captain Brass, but ... this affidavit lacks probable cause. Prints 
on quarters, an admixture of DNA... 
 
GRISSOM:  DNA, if given a warrant, will clear or convict... 
 
JUDGE SLATER: ... are not enough for me to invade the Klinefelds’ 
right to privacy 
 
CSI: Crime Scene Investigators, Assume Nothing (part 1)2 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Although the title ‘genomics and criminal justice’ opens a relatively wide field of 
inquiry, this paper is primarily concerned with the use of genomic technologies by the 
criminal justice service(s), with a particular focus on the use of DNA and DNA 
databases.  The vehicle for this exploration will, for the most part, be the National 
DNA Database of England & Wales. 
 
The above exchange between a Judge and a law enforcement official, though taken 
from fiction, highlights the two key issues raised by the use of DNA and DNA 
databases in the criminal justice setting that will be considered in this paper. Firstly, 
we see the portrayal of DNA as a powerful tool that will serve as the lynch pin of the 
investigator’s case; secondly, we see the Judge’s concern for the ‘privacy’ of the 
suspects. In this context, these two concepts – the utility of DNA and the privacy of 
the individual – are conflicting. These competing interests are mediated by a 
governance process of law and policy – represented in the above exchange by the 
need to satisfy the test of ‘probable cause’ before a warrant can be issued. By 
exploring the interaction between these conflicting notions of utility verses privacy, it 
is hoped that a theoretical framework of principles for governing the use of DNA by 
the criminal justice service can be extrapolated. Are concerns about privacy 
warranted, if the utility of the data is so strong? 
 
Utopia verses Dystopia 
 
In 1943 the physicist Erwin Schrödinger began to explore the workings of the living 
organism from what he described as a ‘naïve physicist’s approach’.3 Through applying 
his knowledge of physics, chemistry and quantum physics he postulated that the 
molecules of the body must contain the script or design for the human body, which 
must necessarily be responsible for the functioning of the structure of the organism. 
Further to this he suggested these molecules must somehow be involved in the 
heredity process studied by geneticists. In essence, he predicted the existence of DNA 
and challenged his colleagues in the biological sciences to find it.  
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Nearly twenty years later, James Watson and Francis Crick were awarded the Nobel 
Prize in Physiology or Medicine4 for their discovery – first published in a letter to 
Nature on the 25 April 19535  – of the double-helix structure of DNA. In 1983, thirty 
years after Watson & Crick’s paper was published and forty years after Erwin 
Schrödinger’s prediction, a 15 year old schoolgirl was raped and murdered in the 
English town of Narborough in the county of Leicestershire. Three years later a 
second schoolgirl was found murdered and sexually assaulted. At the time, it was not 
unusual to test samples found at a crime scene for blood type, but the notion of a DNA 
fingerprint had only recently been discovered, and had never been applied in the 
context of a criminal investigation.6 The police officers investigating the murders 
were convinced that the two crimes were connected (because of the matched blood-
type and the modus operandi of the crime). They arrested a suspect who gave an 
apparently false confession to the second murder, while denying involvement in the 
first. In an effort to link the suspect to both murders, the Police took the unusual step 
of approaching Professor Sir Alec Jeffreys at Leicester University, who had developed 
the scientific process of ‘DNA fingerprinting’ the previous year.7 The results of the 
tests carried out by Professor Jefferys exonerated the suspect, and provided police 
with a ‘DNA fingerprint’ of the actual murder. In the absence of any existing database 
of DNA samples, the Police conducted an ‘intelligence led screening’ of over 5,000 
men in the local area. Eventually, this process led to the arrest of a local baker named 
Colin Pitchfork, his DNA profile was matched with the semen from both murders and 
in 1988 he was sentenced to life for the crimes.8 The purpose of this ad hoc history 
lesson is to place DNA and its forensic use in its historical context. Neither DNA, nor 
its forensic uses are new ideas. 
 
The advent of new scientific or technological developments is often met with 
conflicting reactions. The same is true for developments that could be seen to be new 
applications of an older technology. As the science of DNA and DNA databases 
continues to develop, with its forensic applications continuing to rise, it would seem 
that it attracts both champions and critics. This phenomenon has been observed in 
many contexts and is not always useful. As Gordijn observes, with reference to 
developments in nanotechnology,  ‘[t]he dominance of utopian dreams and 
apocalyptic nightmares in the debate on future perspectives of [new technology] holds 
the risk of unnecessary backlashes. These radical views are the product of one-sided 
perspectives.’9 Although, this extract refers specifically to debates surrounding nano-
technology, the tendency to pit utopia against dystopia is common in the framing of 
debates surrounding new technologies. These visions of the future traditionally 
demonstrate either a great promise, or a great danger from a new technology. They 
may be based on science fact, such as published scientific data, or, they may be 
projections of future developments - truly a vision as opposed to a reality. Many of the 
key narratives in these proposed futures may be drawn from science fiction or have 
become the subject of science fiction. How then do we distinguish scientific truth 
from fiction?  In the case of forensic uses of DNA, the popularity of ‘forensic science 
fiction’ shows such as CSI: Crime Scene Investigators and its various spin-off and 
competing shows, appears to be proliferating an apparently positive utopian view of 
the value of these technologies, leading to what has been termed the ‘CSI effect.’  
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When this concept of a ‘CSI effect,’ already popular in the media, was presented to 
the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) during a 
symposium in February 2005, it prompted a further flurry of testimonials in the 
media. The presenter Dr. Max Houck suggested ‘the CSI effect is basically the 
perception of the near-infallibility of forensic science in response to the TV show. […] 
This TV show comes on and everyone starts watching it - including the cops and 
prosecutors - and submissions to forensic laboratories go through the roof’.10  
In addition to this increase in the workload of forensic science labs, the so-called ‘CSI 
effect’ has had a number of other tangible impacts. Another participant at the 
symposium, Dr Patricia McFeeley observed that ‘survivors are often dissatisfied with 
the investigation into the death of a loved one, demanding more forensic evidence. 
[…] The perception is that the medical examiner isn’t doing all the things they see on 
TV. They expect toxicology results to be instantaneous, instead of taking months, 
which is the reality…They want everything to be tested at a crime scene when it is not 
warranted by the facts or by the fiscal realities of the lab’.11  This apparent perception 
of the power of forensic science generally, and DNA based evidence specifically, has 
also reportedly had an impact on the way that juries deliberate. This is evident in the 
statement of a reporter that because of ‘[the CSI effect] juries from coast to coast 
expecting fancy forensic evidence that will seal a defendant’s guilt or innocence.’12 
The suggestion is that the utopian view of forensic science portrayed through popular 
media is causing juries difficulty when deciding on guilt. In the UK and the USA, for 
a jury to return a guilty verdict in a criminal trial the prosecution must have proved 
guilt ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.13 In contrast, in the UK, the test for guilt or liability 
in a civil court (such as a claim for negligence or breach of contract) is the less 
stringent ‘balance of probabilities test’.14 There have been many examples reported in 
the media15 of decisions that are attributed to this CSI effect causing juries to be 
reliant on the ‘juggernaut of infallible evidence’16 that is presumed to be held by 
forensic science. One reported example is the murder trial of Robert Blake, in which 
jurors, after returning a ‘not guilty’ verdict, are said to have asked ‘why didn’t they try 
to get some DNA, or hair or something, off the jacket?… It would, above all, eliminate 
the need to figure out whether the prosecution had proven its case ‘beyond a 
reasonable doubt’.17 
 
Thus we are faced with the possibility that in the minds of potential jurors forensic 
evidence, specifically DNA evidence, is the key indicator of guilt ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’. The reality of the impact of the ‘CSI effect’ on the criminal justice system 
remains to be seen. A recent review article, in the Yale Law Journal, explores the 
possible social and psychological effects that television shows such as CSI has on 
jurors. It concludes ‘the CSI effect has become an accepted reality by virtue of its 
repeated invocation by the media. Although no existing empirical research shows that 
it actually occurs, on a basic level it accords with the intuitions of participants in the 
trial process.’18 Additionally, we might consider that regardless of the motivation for a 
juror’s decision, an acquittal or conviction by a jury of one’s peers is a simple 
function of the administration of justice. In contemplating the media articles that 
attribute various convictions and acquittals to the CSI, it is difficult not to remember 
the adage known as the Blackstone Ratio that it is ‘better that ten guilty persons 
escape than that one innocent suffer’.19 For if the jurors remain unconvinced by the 
evidence before them, when burden of proof is one of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, they 
have no option but to return a not guilty verdict.  
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Regardless of the weight that the presence (or absence) of DNA evidence might carry 
in the court room, the fact remains that DNA evidence appears to be a powerful aid to 
those investigating crime. Professor Sir Alec Jeffreys, the architect of DNA 
fingerprinting, is reported to have said ‘it does not solve crimes. It establishes whether 
sample X comes from person Y, it is up to the court to interpret that in the context of 
other evidence in a criminal case,’20 which upholds the idea of DNA as an aid in 
investigations, rather than a conclusion. Arguably, the evolution from ‘intelligence led 
screening’ and matching individual samples against individual suspects in custody 
towards a more developed database system seems only logical, so as to provide the 
greatest possible range of samples to be matched against the greatest possible range of 
people. In 1995 the establishment of the National DNA Database (NDNAD) in the 
England and Wales was a world first (at present there is a separate database for 
Scotland & Northern Ireland, although they submit profiles to the NDNAD). Both 
locally and globally, databases that store genetic or genomic data are created for many 
purposes – including medical research and criminal investigation, and contain varying 
amounts and types of data, meaning that every database or biobank is different. Some 
are children of legislation, created specifically by statutes that specify the exact 
parameters of the database in question. Others are created independently of statute or 
statutory instrument, and must interact with existing laws and regulatory frameworks. 
The latter form of databases or biobanks may require the development of new or 
amended regulations after the fact.21 
 
The NDNAD is not a ‘child of legislation’, in that there is no specific ‘National DNA 
Database Act’ which established the database, and defined what details may be stored 
in it or how it may be used. Instead, the database was created as a result of The 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 199422, which, through amendment of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 198423 established the conditions that would allow 
the database to be created. Essentially this was achieved by relaxing the rules relating 
to the collection, retention and use of ‘non-intimate samples’24 and, to a lesser extent, 
‘intimate samples’.25 Such samples, would often (though not exclusively), be used for 
DNA profiling. Various acts of parliament26 have further expanded the powers of the 
police in relation to such samples. This has had the (intended) effect of increasing the 
size of the NDNAD, and thus presumably increasing its power as an investigative tool 
(providing a still larger group of persons to compare to a still larger group of 
samples). The Office of Science & Technology observes, ‘the progressive widening of 
police powers to take samples from suspects together with the permitted retention of 
samples and profiles, irrespective of whether an individual is acquitted or not 
charged, has resulted in a big expansion of the Database’.27 It is this recent 
amendment, to allow the retention of samples from anyone arrested for a ‘recordable 
offence’, regardless of whether or not they have been charged, which appears to have 
caused the most controversy. One of the most highly cited reports which details the 
various problems and concerns raised by the National DNA Database, is that produced 
by GeneWatch UK in January 2005.28  In addition to a review of the current scientific 
and legal status of the NDNAD, the report considers the issue of the protection of 
Human Rights and civil liberties, of which privacy and issues related to privacy 
appear to be the most important. Interestingly, a large section of the report considers 
the potential developments in the field of forensic DNA testing and considers 
potential future uses of the NDNAD.29 Many of these ‘future’ concerns relate to the 
genetic privacy of the individuals whose data is stored on the database and to the 
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overall use of the data for purposes other than that originally intended. The report’s 
executive summary states: 
 
‘The current DNA data used for identification purposes contains 
very limited information about a person’s genes. However, this may 
change in the future with plans to use new technology to exploit the 
information in DNA samples. Some advocates have argued that this 
technology will be able to predict the characteristics of a suspect 
from the DNA evidence at the scene of a crime, generating a 
description along the lines of ‘a tall man, with red hair, blue eyes, 
who’s probably overweight’. Researchers are also looking at 
predicting ethnicity and health status. Some even believe it will be 
possible to predict a person’s personality or behaviour. However, 
there are serious scientific problems with most of these approaches. 
Not only is some of the research fundamentally flawed, much of it is 
unlikely to produce particularly useful or accurate predictions. 
There is also a danger that the information will be used selectively to 
reinforce existing prejudices, for example about race or skin colour. 
Nevertheless, a few genetic tests can reveal important information 
about some people’s health. If use of this new technology were 
expanded to stored samples from known individuals on the database, 
the increase in police access to genetic information could pose an 
even greater threat to privacy.’  
 
Thus it seems that these fears are contemplating a vision of a future where forensic 
databases, such as NDNAD, develop powers that are concerned with decoding genetic 
genomic material, rather than comparing and contrasting samples. These ‘genome 
focused’ applications each have many potential uses and potential perils. As Onay 
explains, there is an inherent danger in placing too much faith in the thesis of genetic 
determinism – particularly as regards personality or behaviour – within a criminal 
justice setting. He comments that ‘jurisprudential reactions to research into genetic 
criminality have been based on misinformation and consequently have exaggerated 
the ramifications of this research for the criminal justice system’.30 Concerns about 
the possible misuse of this data are thus perhaps located within this confusion that 
Onay highlights. Is it really a concern that if (in the future) the police had the ability 
to screen for genetic indicators of personality, they might assume these to be 
definitive indicators of guilt or innocence? Or at least a propensity towards a certain 
kind of behaviour. Nevertheless, as Franz Joseph Gall noted in relation to his creation 
of phrenology as a (now debunked) science to determine behaviour, ‘it is only this 
struggle against the propensities which gives rise to virtue, to vice, and moral 
responsibility. What would that self denial, so much recommended, amount to, if it did 
not suppose a combat with ourselves ? and then, the more we multiply and fortify the 
preservatives, the more man gains in free agency and moral liberty’.31 Perhaps then, 
any concern about the use of such information must be related to its misuse (the use 
for purposes other than the genuine detection and deterrence of crime), or perhaps 
more accurately to its misinterpretation.  
 
In addition to comments on privacy, the Genewatch report suggests that: 
 
‘Other national databases are being planned and developed, 
including the National Identity Register to support the use of ID 
cards, and the new NHS Electronic Care Record Service, which may 
contain some genetic data in the future. It is not clear under what 
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circumstances the police will be allowed access to this information. 
Nor is it clear whether any of these databases will be linked, 
possibly allowing other Government bodies to find out who is on the 
NDNAD. Expanding and/or linking these databases would give the 
state unprecedented abilities to monitor the UK population, greatly 
increasing the threats to our privacy. There are concerns that this 
access could all too easily be abused, taking the UK closer towards 
an oppressive ‘police state.’ 32 
 
It has already been suggested that it is common to see debates on new (or improved) 
technologies polarized around opposing utopian or dystopian visions of the future. 
Interestingly, the same potential advances might be used to support opposing 
arguments. For example, the proposed future occurrence of DNA evidence at the 
scene of a crime, generating a description along the lines of ‘a tall man, with red hair, 
blue eyes, who’s probably overweight’, could potentially be a useful tool in the 
identification of suspects where a DNA sample is found at a crime scene that does not 
match an existing profile in the database. However, when considering the reality of 
the technology in question, Haga suggests that  
 
‘[i]n comparison to the quantitative preciseness and accuracy of the 
13-marker core STR DNA identification profile, AIMs and genetic 
markers associated with ancestry and physical or behavioral traits 
appear to be far less reliable for identification purposes. Regardless 
of the validity of this technology or whether it will be useful to 
forensic investigators, expanded genome profiling will pose major 
challenges in its use.’33 
 
It seems that when contemplating the application of new (or improved) technologies, 
we are being asked to perform a number of balancing acts. The first is to balance the 
various utopian and dystopian visions to establish a grasp on the reality of the science 
as it is today, and to arrive at a balanced vision of the science that may be tomorrow. I 
would suggest that it is the consideration together of science fact alongside ‘science 
potentia’ (as distinct from science fiction), that is the most important starting point to 
any governance analysis of a new technology. Thus whilst utopian and dystopian 
visions of the future can often have the effect of polarising debates, in the early stages 
of the debate their presence is perhaps vital to allowing the framing of the debate and 
therefore facilitating this balancing process.  
 
Does size matter? 
 
As research continues into the potential viability and impact of expanded uses of DNA 
by the Criminal Justice, the fact remains that – for now – the role of DNA 
fingerprinting and the DNA database is still that it ‘establishes whether sample X 
comes from person Y’. It is the police who solve crimes, and the courts who convict. 
The NDNAD is the largest DNA database for criminal justice purposes in the world, 
with a reported 3.45 million (representing about 5.2% of the UK population) profiles 
and 263,923 crime scene sample profiles as of the end of December 2005.34 
Notwithstanding any potential - positive or negative - skew of conviction rates for 
‘CSI Effect’, the utility of this database seems apparent. The National DNA Database 
Annual Report 2004–2005 contains a large amount of data which points to the 
efficacy and utility of the NDNAD.35 The table reproduced below (Table 1) indicates 
the number of matches of crime scene samples, to suspect(s)’ DNA profiles.  
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Table 1: Crime Scene – Suspect Matches36 
 
 1998/99 1999/2000 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 
DNA 
Matches 
 
21.239 
 
23,021 
 
30,894 
 
49,913 
 
45,269 
 
40,169 
 
To help interpret this data, the Annual Report explains that:  
 
 ‘matches between a crime scene and a subject are useful in 
identifying possible suspects for the offence. Since May 2001, 
195,779 crime scene profiles have been matched with 157,096 
separate individuals. For 126,883 of the crime scene profiles, a 
single suspect was reported. For the remainder, a list of potential 
suspects was produced. The identification of more than one potential 
suspect as the source of the DNA at some scenes is largely due to the 
significant proportion of crime scene sample profiles that are 
partial…The number of crimes with DNA matches rose from 23,021 
in 1999-2000 to a peak of 49,913 in 2002/2003 (a 74% increase) 
before falling to 45,269 in 2003/2004 and then to 40,169 in 
2004/2005. The fall in DNA matches after 2002/2003 broadly 
correlates with the fall in the total number of recorded crimes over 
the same time frame (i.e. fewer crimes, fewer crime scenes being 
visited, and fewer crime scene sample DNA profiles being loaded, 
leading to fewer matches).’37 
 
To place these figures in further context, the table below (Table 2) – reproduced from 
home office figures published by the Office of Science & Technology38 – purports to 
demonstrate the impact of DNA on crime detection. The first column represents the 
overall percentage of crime detected, whilst the second column represents the 
percentage of crimes detected where DNA crime scene samples are loaded on the 
Database (the term detected, is taken to mean solved in this context). 
 
Table 2: Crime Detections  
 
Crime Category National Crime Detection Rate DNA Detection Rate 
All recorded crime 26 40 
Domestic Burglary 16 41 
Non-domestic Burglary 11 50 
Theft of Vehicle 15 24 
Theft from Vehicle 8 63 
Theft from vehicle 14 51 
 
The implication is that, crimes are more readily solved if there is DNA evidence. The 
House of Commons Science & Technology Committee comment that ‘DNA evidence 
now represents a vital instrument for facilitating investigations and securing 
convictions. We believe that the recent expansion of the database would make a 
review of the impact of the NDNAD on the detection and deterrence of crime timely.’39  
It would seem that it is necessary to establish the realities of this impact, and take care 
that current figures are not creating a ‘real life’ CSI: Effect. 
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Assuming the results of such an investigation were positive, and showed that the 
NDNAD was indeed leading to an improvement in the detection and deterrence of 
crime, then logic would suggest that a larger database would have a larger impact on 
the detection and deterrence of crime. 
 
Moreover, there are other uses to which the NDNAD, and others like it, fall under the 
auspices of the criminal justice service, but do not relate directly to the detection and 
deterrence of crime. Consider for example, the events of September 11th 2001, 
December 26th 2004 and July 7th 2005. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre 
in New York, the Boxing Day Tsunami in the South Pacific and the terrorist attacks on 
the London transport system have all proved a particular challenge for the criminal 
justice services in relation to their use of various forensic technologies, not simply for 
the need to identify the remains of suicide bombers in the aftermath of terrorist 
attacks, but also because of the need to identify the countless left dead in the wake of 
such attacks and natural disasters. Before the end of the day on September 11th 2001, 
the US company Genecodes was asked to take the lead in developing a system to 
assist in the identification of 20,000 human remains, linking them to samples 
collected from family members and personal items. This would later lead to the 
development of the Mass-Fatality Identification System [M-FISys].40 It is possible 
that the existence of a large-scale database of some kind might have assisted in the 
identification of the deceased more readily. Newspaper reports from the time of the 
Boxing Day Tsunami and the 7th of July London bombings41 point to DNA as being 
the ‘gold standard’ for identification, but highlight the difficulties, and limited 
usefulness, of DNA profiling in ‘disaster’ situations where there is a lack of 
infrastructure. The indication would be that whilst DNA testing is hard to perform 
without a laboratory, fingerprinting and dental records can be compared by simpler 
means, although DNA remains the gold standard. 
 
Not Guilty verses Not Retained 
 
We have seen a gradual expansion of police powers relating to the collection, 
retention and use of DNA and related samples. As Kaye observes, this increase in 
powers appears directly related to this perception of the utility of the science: 
 
‘As forensic techniques continue to improve, reports on the success 
of the police in using DNA analysis for solving past and present 
criminal cases are becoming an everyday occurrence in the media.  
The importance of DNA analysis as a police investigative tool is also 
increasingly evident in the ‘fight against terrorism’ which has 
resulted in increased police powers. There are two avenues by which 
police can collect and obtain access to DNA samples. The first is 
through the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and its 
amending legislation,42 that allows the police to forcibly collect 
samples in some situations.  The second is through an access order 
granted by the court, which allows access to samples from existing 
collections held by other parties.’43 
 
One such expansion, under s84 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, effective 
as of May 2001, allowed for the retention of samples of those who had been acquitted 
of the crime of which they had been accused when the sample was first taken. In this 
situation, ‘the fingerprints or samples may be retained after they have fulfilled the 
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purposes for which they were taken but shall not be used by any person except for 
purposes related to the prevention or detection of crime, the investigation of an 
offence or the conduct of a prosecution’.44 Prior to this point in time, such samples 
ought to have been destroyed upon acquittal, exoneration or failure to prosecute. The 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 further extended these powers ‘to allow a non-intimate 
sample to be taken without consent’, where ‘the person is in police detention in 
consequence of his arrest for a recordable offence’.45 In this context, a ‘recordable 
offence’ is defined as any offence ‘punishable with imprisonment and any offence 
specified in the Schedule [to The National Police Records (Recordable Offences) 
Regulations 2000]’.46 The interaction of this provision with the earlier amendment, 
means that anyone who is arrested (for a recordable offence) can have their DNA 
added to the NDNAD, and that sample may be kept and used in the same way as the 
sample belonging to a person who was charged, but not convicted. Thus the DNDAD 
has been expanded to include not just the DNA of convicted criminals and volunteers 
who have given written consent, but also those who might simply have been in the 
‘wrong place at the wrong time’. Interestingly, the House of Commons Select 
Committee on Science and Technology, identified a need for further independent 
research into ‘public attitude towards retention of DNA samples (both from convicted 
criminals and others), and the evidence of benefits associated with this practice’. They 
also make comments on the need for greater ethical oversight of the database and 
stakeholder scrutiny of the database.47 This suggests some potential discomfort with 
the idea of continuous retention of samples.  
 
In a briefing paper published in June 2005, Genewatch suggested that  
 
‘few people have problems with the idea of the police comparing the 
DNA of a suspect with DNA left at the scene of a serious crime. 
However, concerns arise when DNA profiles and other information 
are stored permanently on a database, especially when the database 
includes large numbers of innocent people. The three main areas of 
concern about the NDNAD are: its impacts on people’s privacy; the 
potential for misuse by governments; and whether it discriminates 
against certain groups of people.’48 
 
In response to these concerns, two (conjoined) judicial review cases R v. Chief 
Constable of South Yorkshire Police ex parte LS (by his mother and litigation friend 
JB)  and R v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (Respondent) ex parte Marper 
reached the House of Lords in July 2004.49 The central question in both cases was 
whether the amended provisions of 64(1A) were compatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights - as incorporated into UK Law by the Human Rights 
Act 1998 - and in particular with the Convention rights contained in articles 8 (Article 
8: Right To Respect For Private And Family Life )50 and 14 (Prohibition Of 
Discrimination )51. The appeal of both parties was dismissed. Lord Steyn, delivering 
the main judgement, explored the nature of DNA and the NDNAD, and appeared 
content with their utility, recognising them as powerful tools. He stated in opening: 
 
‘It is of paramount importance that law enforcement agencies should 
take full advantage of the available techniques of modern technology 
and forensic science. Such real evidence has the inestimable value of 
cogency and objectivity. It is in large measure not affected by the 
subjective defects of other testimony. It enables the guilty to be 
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detected and the innocent to be rapidly eliminated from enquiries. 
Thus in the 1990s closed circuit television (CCTV) became a crime 
prevention strategy extensively adopted in British cities and towns. 
The images recorded facilitate the detection of crime and 
prosecution of offenders. Making due allowance for the possibility of 
threats to civil liberties, this phenomenon has had beneficial effects.’ 
 
The use of fingerprint evidence in this country dates from as long ago as 1902. In due 
course other advances of forensic science followed. But the dramatic breakthrough 
was the use of DNA techniques since the 1980s. The benefits to the criminal justice 
system are enormous. For example, recent Home Office statistics show that while the 
annual detection rate of domestic burglary is only 14%, when DNA is successfully 
recovered from a crime scene this rises to 48%. It is, of course, true that such evidence 
is capable of being misused and that courts must be ever watchful to eliminate risks of 
human error creeping in. But as a matter of policy it is a high priority that police 
forces should expand the use of such evidence where possible and practicable.’52 
 
Thus it seems that, Lord Steyn, in his opening arguments, before describing the legal 
deliberations relating to the European Convention, has performed the balancing of 
Utopian and Dystopian visions. He considers the apparent value of the database, 
contrasts it with other technological developments, and considers the concerns of data 
misuse. Later in the case, testimony from Liberty – that had been granted permission 
to intervene when the case(s) were heard in the Court of Appeal –further highlighted 
these concerns, indicating that ‘the range of genetic information that may be derived 
from DNA samples is of a highly private nature’ and suggested that ‘the samples 
provided more information about the person who provided the samples than is needed 
for the identification of those involved in crime’.53 Lord Brown of Eaton-under-
Heywood appeared to engage with the utopia/distopia analysis with even more vigour. 
He agreed with Lord Steyn’s legal reasoning, but added by way of obiter dicta: 
 
‘Given the carefully defined and limited use to which the DNA 
database is permitted to be put—essentially the detection and 
prosecution of crime—I find it difficult to understand why anyone 
should object to the retention of their profile (and sample) on the 
database once it has lawfully been placed there. The only logical 
basis I can think of for such an objection is that it will serve to 
increase the risk of the person’s detection in the event of his 
offending in future. But that could hardly be a legitimate objection, 
nor, indeed, is it advanced as such. Such objections as were 
suggested, however, seem to be entirely chimerical. First, the fear of 
an Orwellian future in which retained samples will be re-analysed 
by a mischievous State in the light of scientific advances and the 
results improperly used against the person’s interest. If, of course, 
this were a valid objection it would apply no less to samples taken 
from the convicted as from the unconvicted and logically, therefore, 
it would involve the destruction of everyone’s samples. But no such 
abuse is presently threatened and if and when it comes to be then 
will be the time to address it. Sufficient unto the day is the evil 
thereof.’54 
 
In this passage, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood directly addresses the ‘police 
state’ and the possible abuse – by whatever means- of the database by a ‘mischievous 
state’ that appear in what I have characterised dystopian literature.55  However, he 
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does not suggest that such developments are to be encouraged, equally he does not 
suggest they be ignored, simply that they are neither a real, nor present danger. 
Moreover, he later advocates further expansion of the database, following similar 
logic to the argument that a larger database would have a larger impact on the 
detection and deterrence of crime.56 It is interesting that one of appellants in this case 
was a minor. A recent study by Levitt & Tomasini showed that ‘the parents and 
children in this study supported the existence of a NDNAD and its use to solve crime. 
However, they had reservations about samples being taken for petty crime, were 
critical where there was a lack of parental involvement and felt that there are dangers 
of stigmatising young people for a one-off act’.57 The concept of stigmatisation links 
closely with the discussions of discrimination and privacy that were discussed in the 
case that was heard before the House of Lord’s. Is this fear more closely tied to the 
way that the data might be used or misused in the future than to concerns about 
privacy? Again we return to the idea (as valued by the parents and children in the 
Levitt & Tomasini study) that the NDNAD is a useful tool, and but again there seems 
to be some underlying concern, or lack of trust, that the database will be used 
properly. 
 
The Principles of Naivety and Community 
 
As we explore the impact of the NDNAD, and by association other databases 
designed for the same purpose, we are faced with complex utopian visions of a 
criminal justice service armed with an all powerful database for the benefit of society, 
contrasted with the dystopian vision of a criminal justice service, armed with the 
identical, all powerful database intent on mischief to our detriment. As has been 
suggested, in the absence of clairvoyant abilities, we must navigate these conflicting 
visions of the future to arrive at that vision which we believe most likely to become 
reality. The nature of this balancing process can, and frequently does, result in the 
rationale polarisation of arguments (for better or for worse) around one of the poles of 
the debate – in favour or against a particular technology. 
 
Chadwick and Berg have suggested, in relation to genetic database initiatives 
designed for research purposes, that  
 
‘Genetic database initiatives have given rise to considerable debate 
about their potential harms and benefits. The question arises as to 
whether existing ethical frameworks are sufficient to mediate between 
the competing interests at stake. One approach is to strengthen 
mechanisms for obtaining informed consent and for protecting 
confidentiality. However, there is increasing interest in other ethical 
frameworks, involving solidarity — participation in research for the 
common good — and the sharing of the benefits of research.’58  
 
Similarly Harris suggests a potential ‘moral imperative’ to contribute to research, 
resulting, in part, from the benefits – both explicit and implied – that we receive from 
living in a society that conducts scientific research59. Could such ideas be equally 
important when considering the principles and frameworks for databases designed for 
use by the criminal justice service?  
 
If it is true, as per Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, that ‘the more complete the 
database, the better the chance of detecting criminals, both those guilty of crimes past 
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and those whose crimes are yet to be committed. The better chance too of deterring 
from future crime those whose profiles are already on the database’, can it not then be 
shown that all members of society would benefit from this reduction in crime. In 
creating such benefits does this not develop a moral imperative to donate your sample 
to such a database, so as to create the most powerful database possible? The danger 
with this line of reasoning is that in pursuit of our supposed utopian criminal justice 
system we might end up justifying measures that result in the despised dystopia.  
 
Thus any proposed moral imperative to donate a sample to a DNA database designed 
for use by the criminal justice service must be subject to some safeguards of the 
participants’ rights. Yet these notions, that are communitarian in nature, would always 
require the surrender of some right or privilege, in return for some community or 
societal benefit. Is it the case then that the risk of the misuse of data, or the 
persecution of unfortunate individuals on the basis of genetic information, is 
acceptable? My response is no, it is not. However, some reduction in the rights and 
privileges of the individual, as regards individual privacy, is acceptable in the pursuit 
of a more powerful database, designed to bring about the societal gain of a reduction 
of crime (or other benefits such as an ability to identify a hitherto unidentified corpse). 
Perhaps, in this context, it is necessary to consider the rights of the ‘innocent’ and not 
the individual as sacrosanct.  
 
In response, I suggest the following model, which I have termed the ‘Naïve Position’ 
as the starting point for navigating the complex network of competing interests. 
 
If it can be shown that  (a) the innocent have nothing to fear; and 
    (b) that society has much to gain, 
 
then the application of the technology in question is acceptable.  
 
The careful application of this model once again requires the careful consideration and 
balancing of utopian ideals against dystopian concerns to identify the reality of the 
effect that the technology concerned will have on ‘the innocent’. This in turn must then 
be balanced against overall societal benefits, and appropriate safeguards must then be 
put in place to facilitate both the protection of the innocent and the gain of society.  
 
Perhaps this becomes impossible to realise, as too many competing interests 
neutralize any possible benefit. Perhaps it is the case, with forensic DNA databases 
and other genomic technologies, that is not the principle of a technology, but the 
method of its application that causes problems. For example, there would likely be a 
marked benefit to be gained from a population wide genetic database for the criminal 
justice service (particularly in terms of its impact on detection and deterrence of 
crime), but that benefit is open to abuse. It is desirable that the criminal be 
apprehended, or better still that the potential criminal be deterred from offending.  
However, we remain unable to safeguard the innocent by ensuring such a database is 
used for no other purpose – either now or in the future – than ‘to establish whether 
sample X comes from person Y’. In essence, we remain to unable to navigate between 
the competing visions of the future.  
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